CEEPR Workshop Cambridge, MA December 2006

New Developments in Oil Futures Markets

John E. Parsons




Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research

Front Month, NYMEX-WTI, 1986-2006












Historically, Oil Futures are "Backwardated"





Backwardation, Inventory & Convenience Yield

if you can manage it, it's cheaper to purchase supplies ahead of time in the futures market and organize operations to use them "just in time"


holding stocks pays a cost above and beyond the simple storage cost

- Buying at the high spot price, contracting the future sale at the low, distant futures price, and holding the commodity to close out the transaction...
- Buying high, selling low, *and* paying the storage cost
- holders of inventories must be earning a "return" somehow to compensate – we infer a high convenience yield to the inventories



Backwardation is the Source of Commodity Portfolio Performance Returns

Figure 3



Stocks, Bonds, and Commodity Futures Inflation Adjusted Performance 1959/7-2004/12

from Facts and Fantasies about Commodity Futures by Gary Gorton and K. Geert Rouwenhorst, 2005



Backwardation is the Source of Commodity Portfolio Performance Returns

Figure 3 Stocks, Bonds, and Commodity Futures Inflation Adjusted Performance 1959/7-2004/12 2,000 The return on oil has been 10 1,750 percentage points higher than the return on the commodity Stocks 5.65% avg. risk prem. 1.500 portfolio as a whole. Comm. 5.23% 1,250 avg. risk prem. 1,000 **Commodity Futures** 750 Stocks 500 250 Bonds 0 1999 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 2003

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Goldman Sachs created its GSCI in 1991

- Collateralized futures: buy 2nd maturity out and roll when it is the prompt month before delivery dates
- A diversified commodity index
- But energy commodities dominate...approx 70% of capitalization
- Within energy crude is 44%, natural gas 9%



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- \$40 billion invested, 90% from pension funds
- These now represent nearly 50% of open interest in oil futures



Are the Speculators Responsible for the Rise in Oil Prices?

a view surprisingly reinforced by BP's CEO, Lord Browne:

- The Times of London, April '06: Lord Browne blamed [the increase of the crude oil price] on nervousness in the financial markets over the conflict in Iraq and a big increase in activity by speculative financial investors in oil. He said: "The scale of this [financial investment] has risen significantly, it has got much larger. We don't know whether it makes things more volatile. It is the case that the price of oil has gone up while nothing has changed physically."



Influence Exists



"Goldman Sachs, which runs the largest commodity index, the G.S.C.I., said in early August that it was reducing the index's weighting in gasoline futures significantly. "They started unwinding their positions, and those other longs also rushed to the door at the same time," said Lawrence J. Goldstein, president of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation. Wholesale prices for New York Harbor unleaded gasoline, the major gasoline contract traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange, dropped 18 cents a gallon on Aug. 10, to \$1.9889 a gallon, a decline of more than 8 percent, and they have dropped further since then."



Influence Exists

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
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The New York Eimes

06






Recently, Oil Futures Moved Into "Contango"



This is a Normal, Occasional Phenomenon






Current Contango Has Been Long-lasting

- Since Nov '04, two years running in contango out to 12M
- Previous 5 years, 12M contango less than 9% of the time
 - Mention other notable windows
- Not just at a trough




Long-end of the Curve Used to Rise






...But Now Falls






Declining Risk-Neutral Drift?






Declining Risk-Neutral Drift?





Volatility Has Not Increased

3-Month Rolling Volatility



Apr-86 Oct-88 Apr-91 Oct-93 Apr-96 Oct-98 Apr-01 Oct-03 Apr-06



What Can Explain These Phenomena?



Model of Futures Prices

- Futures prices equal the expected spot price...
- But risk-adjusted!
- Futures prices are the risk-neutral oil price
- The size of the risk-premia determine how the shape of the futures curve deviates from the shape of the forecasted spot price



Determinants of the Shape of the Futures Curve at the Long End

Slope (not the level) at the long-end has two elements growth rate in the spot price

less the market price of long-term oil factor risk

- Assuming spot prices are flat or falling in the long-run, then a rising futures curve implies a negative market price of long-term oil factor risk.
- A shift to a falling futures curve implies <u>a rise</u> in the market price of long-term oil factor risk



Determinants of the Shape of the Futures Curve at the Short End

The primary factor at the short end is the transient disruptions in the supply-demand balance;

- is the short-run spot price above or below the long-run trajectory?
- if above, then it is expected to fall, and futures prices will reflect this and slope downward,
- if below, then it is expected to rise, and futures prices will reflect this
- The market price of short-term oil factor risk also enters the equation
- To get the degree of contango obsered recently, and to get it consistently as the spot price has spike and fallen sharply requires a <u>negative</u> market price of short-term oil factor risk



What Can Explain These Phenomena?

increasing market price of long-term oil price risk

- or a shift to a belief in the long-term decline in oil prices

declining market price of short-term oil price risk?

- evidence for inflow of available risk-capital at the short end?
- evidence is not in the levels, but in the shape of the curve

timing is not coincident

